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Abstract:  
Despite numerous and increasing attempts to define what life is, there is no consensus on necessary 
and sufficient conditions for life. Accordingly, some scholars have questioned the value of definitions 
of life and encouraged scientists and philosophers alike to discard the project. As an alternative to 
this pessimistic conclusion, we argue that critically rethinking the nature and uses of definitions can 
provide new insights into the epistemic roles of definitions of life for different research practices. 
This paper examines the possible contributions of definitions of life in scientific domains where such 
definitions are used most (e.g., Synthetic Biology, Origins of Life, Alife, and Astrobiology). Rather 
than as classificatory tools for demarcation of natural kinds, we highlight the pragmatic utility of what 
we call operational definitions that serve as theoretical and epistemic tools in scientific practice. In 
particular, we examine contexts where definitions integrate criteria for life into theoretical models 
that involve or enable observable operations. We show how these definitions of life play important 
roles in influencing research agendas and evaluating results, and we argue that to discard the project 
of defining life is neither sufficiently motivated, nor possible without dismissing important theoretical 
and practical research. 
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 1. Introduction 
The fundamental question of what life is was for many years set aside by the success of experimental 
studies of molecular structures in Biology, but the issue has recently gained increasing popularity and 
attention (Gilbert & Sarkar, 2000; Woese, 2004; Cornish-Bowden, 2006; Nicholson, 2014; Moreno 
& Mossio, 2015). Accordingly, the more specific issue of defining life has also raised renewed interest 
in Biology and in Philosophy. Whereas many 20th century biologists considered the problem of 
defining life a purely theoretical or even metaphysical question, often characterised by a 
compromising vitalist flavour (Mayr, 1982), several new fields now take this to be a fundamental 
question. Examples are Synthetic Biology, Origins of Life, Astrobiology and computational Artificial 
Life in which definitions of life have become an established research topic connected to the 
characterisation, detection, demarcation and synthesis of life (Luisi, 2006; Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 2010). 
The renewed attention to definitions is, however, also followed by renewed criticisms. It is our aim 
in this paper to examine the arguments of these criticisms in comparison to the roles that definitions 
of life play in scientific research practices.  
The background for the criticism is the lack of consensus among scholars who have proposed 
definitions of life. Despite various and long-lasting efforts to define life, there is no agreement on the 
central features that unite living systems and separate these from inanimate matter. More generally, 
there is no shared position on the importance of definitions of life in the practice of science (Szostak 
et al., 2001; Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 2010; Tirard et al. 2010; Trifonov, 2011;2012; Szostak, 2012).  
A few criticisms from philosophers stand out as radically undermining the project of defining life, 
and as possibly leading to the abandonment of this enterprise as pointless or even detrimental to the 
sciences involved. Against the background of diversity of definitions, Edouard Machery recently 
argued that: “the project of defining life is either impossible or pointless” (Machery, 2012, 145). 
Insofar as this enterprise is spread over many disciplines with diverging interests, preferences, goals 
and research traditions, and insofar as it is also possible that life might not even form a single natural 
kind, he argues that a consensus cannot be reached. In parallel, Carol Cleland proposes four main 
arguments against definitions of life (Cleland & Chyba, 2002; 2007; Cleland, 2012). The first and 
more fundamental, she sustains, is that definitions are limited conceptual tools that cannot express 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a natural kind. Second, she criticises the use of definitions as 
theoretical identity statements by pointing to their incapability to encapsulate scientific theories and 
the distinctive properties of the objects they describe. Third, she argues that definitions are likely to 
make scientists blind to other possibilities (e.g., alternative life forms) and therefore are likely to 
mislead us. Four, she argues that since we only know one example of life (the one found on Earth), 
there is no well-developed general theory of life available upon which to rely in order to distinguish 
necessary from contingent properties of life1. 
In the face of such criticisms ─ and, indeed, precisely by taking them into account ─ this paper aims 
at clarifying the importance of definitions of life in scientific practice and in the theoretical 
advancement of the disciplines involved.	The real point of contention, we argue, is what is taken to 
count as a definition, and for what purposes definitions are offered (or taken to be offered). Rather 
																																								 																				
1	We address the first criticism in Section 2.1, and the others in section 4.2.	
than taking for grated what a definition means in the context of analytical philosophy as demarcating 
natural kinds, we approach the issue of definitions from a pragmatic standpoint. We focus on the 
possible contributions to research in those domains in which are used most (Synthetic Biology, 
Origins of Life, Alife, and Astrobiology).  
By analysing the practical utility of definitions of life in scientific practice, we propose that definitions 
of life in these domains should be considered in a non-standard and weaker sense, as operational 
definitions. This choice of terminology is inspired by the use of the same term in the scientific 
literatures of Origins of Life and Synthetic Biology (e.g., Fleischaker, 1990; Luisi 1998). We use the 
term ‘operational’ in a wide sense, referring both to (1) the possibility to define something by means 
of operations (e.g., defining an entity by measuring or building it following a specific procedure), and 
(2) the idea that the contents of the definition (e.g., the conditions for life) can be operationalised for 
empirical research, that is, can be built, manipulated and tested in the laboratory. We are aware that 
in other philosophical debates and domains of science operational definitions have slightly different 
uses, related to the first meaning.2 Yet, we choose to adhere to its use in the scientific literature and 
refer by ‘operational definitions’ to the second meaning as well (for a more detailed discussion, see 
Sections 3 and 4).  
Importantly, the content of operational definitions can be object of experimental or formal scientific 
analysis. Properties that cannot be objects of scientific research because of practical reasons, for 
example due to limits in the technological or formal tools available at a certain moment, or 
metaphysical dispositions like entelechies, cannot be part of an operational definition in this sense. 
Operational definitions of life are connected to specific theoretical models which integrate sets of 
contextually relevant criteria for life that involve or enable observable or experimental operations (in 
the laboratory, on another planet, or in a software program). This means abandoning several features 
usually associated with definitions of life in the philosophical debate, such as strict ontological claims 
associated with definitive or stipulative demarcations of necessary and sufficient conditions for life, 
that are fixed once and for all and demarcate life as a natural kind.  
We first examine the background of the debate and the main challenges to definitions of life, brought 
forth by Machery and Cleland (Section 2). Even though these criticisms call for a critical rethinking 
of the nature and role of definitions, we argue that the pessimistic conclusions do not follow once 
strong ontological claims on the relation between definitions and natural kinds are abandoned. Section 
3 discusses the utility of definitions of life in fields that explore the frontiers of Biology. Specifically, 
we analyse the role played in the line of investigation pursued by Pier Luigi Luisi’s research group 
in Origins of Life and Synthetic Biology. In Section 4, we propose that an operational account better 
captures the use of definitions of life in these fields, and we respond to possible objections. Section 5 
concludes with some general remarks on the distinction between operational and strong definitions.  
 
2. Philosophical challenges to the attempts to define life 
																																								 																				
2	In some scientific debates, ‘operational’ is limited to the first use. The way we use the term here should also not be 
confused with the broader notion of operationalism, i.e., the view of some logical positivists that the meaning of a term 
bears solely on the methods for its empirical measurement. 	
The difficulties of catching the distinctive and universal character of living systems and of reaching 
a consensus on a single definition ─ due to the great diversity of living phenomena, which ‘resists the 
confines of any compact definition’ (Szostak et al., 2001: 387) ─ do not seem to have discouraged 
the enterprise to define life. Rather, attempts from distinct disciplines and research traditions have 
multiplied. Popa’s extensive work (2004) lists almost 100 different definitions of life, not counting 
more recent contributions, among these are for instance several organizational accounts (Ruiz-Mirazo 
et al., 2010; Bich & Damiano, 2012) and cybernetic approaches (Tsolokov, 2010), just to cite few of 
them.  
In the face of this variety, several attempts to systematize the debate and advance unifying definitions 
have been made (Kompanichenko, 2008; Trifonov, 2011). In this context of intense discussion and 
implementation of different strategies (Szostak, 2012; Trifonov, 2012), several journals have recently 
dedicated special issues to definitions of life: Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres (2010, 40-
2), Synthese (2012, 185-1), and SEBBM (2013, 175). In addition, one of the four sections of the 
comprehensive book edited by Bedau and Cleland on the Nature of Life (2010, Sec IV) is specifically 
dedicated to contributions on this topic. Papers in these publications defend, challenge or profoundly 
criticise the general quest for definitions. Moreover, criticisms have also been made of the use of 
definitions in specific fields, namely Astrobiology (Cleland & Chyba, 2007; Cleland, 2012) and 
Origins of Life (Szostak, 2012). The following subsection describes in further detail the philosophical 
criticisms by Machery and Cleland..  
2.1 Definitions of life and natural kinds 
In light of the proliferation of definitions of life, Machery (2012) argues that if defining life is a 
scientific project like defining gene, virus, cell etc., then the project is pointless because different 
scientific disciplines, or even research groups within the same discipline, do not reach a consensus3. 
A central assumption in Machery’s argument is that the project of defining life is one of finding one 
unified conceptual definition that covers all and only the relevant life forms, and on which all 
scientists would agree. The idea is that the aim of defining scientific concepts is to arrive at consensus 
on necessary and sufficient conditions for specific terms or classes. One problem with definitions of 
life results from the diversity of preferences for definitions held by individual scientists with different 
disciplinary and theoretical backgrounds as well as different research agendas. For instance, scientists 
interested in uncovering the origins of life are interested in defining minimal biochemical life forms 
that may not be compatible with strong accounts of Artificial Life that argue that life is independent 
of materiality. Similarly, astrobiologists interested in understanding what components and 
organisations could support life on other planets, and how to detect it, may have other restrictions for 
a satisfactory definition of life. Moreover, the prospects of finding one unified definition that covers 
all and only the relevant life forms are challenged by the fact that it is “unclear whether living beings 
form a single natural kind since nature rarely yields a unique way of classifying the world” (Machery 
2012: 159). In other words, we may be trying to identify the boundaries of a group of entities that 
upon closer inspection do not form a single natural kind. 
Cleland’s argument, grounded in metaphysics, is even more radical. She claims that definitions in 
general are incapable of answering questions about natural kinds and are therefore useless for 
																																								 																				
3	In the same paper Machery (2012) also proposes also an argument against definitions of life in folk psychology. We 
will not address it here, as we are interested in their use in science. 
scientific investigation. Her criticism leans on Putnam’s (1975) famous Twin Earth Example, which 
she uses to argue that the extension of a term is not fully determined by the concepts in the mind 
(Cleland, 2012; see also Kripke, 1972). The Twin Earth Example4 suggests that insofar as definitions 
are dependent on concepts formed by subjective and fallible features of human thoughts and language, 
they cannot provide necessary and sufficient conditions for demarcating natural categories or entities. 
Yet, according to Cleland, this is precisely what is usually required of them. Hence, if scientists and 
philosophers alike are interested in demarcating and identifying life as a natural kind ─ or in 
establishing for example whether an entity such as a virus is alive or not ─ in a strong ontological 
sense, then appealing to a definition is a wrong choice. Moreover, in Cleland’s view the use of 
definitions carries also practical issues and risks, insofar as it may contribute to entrenching a 
misconception or just restate what scientists already know (see Section 4.2). 
Machery’s and Cleland’s criticisms seem to leave no other choice but to abandon the enterprise of 
defining life, since definitions cannot provide univocal necessary and sufficient conditions for life. 
Importantly, however, their criticisms primarily target the capability of definitions to mark out natural 
kinds. We stress that there are other ways to understand the role of definitions by focusing on their 
used in scientific practice.  
2.2 An alternative pathway: disengaging from strong requirements on natural kinds 
The debate on natural kinds has itself generated a variety of incompatible theories and raised 
criticisms. In particular, if definitions are understood as attempts to demarcate static ontological 
categories with very strict and rigid boundaries, they are vulnerable targets of Machery and Cleland’s 
criticisms. But our claim is that this characterisation of definitions is inadequate to account for the 
role of definitions of life in scientific practice. An alternative approach, advanced by Goodman 
(1983), Brigandt (2011) and others, invokes a pragmatic or instrumental use of natural kinds as 
research tools, rather than attempts to establish a unique and best way to classify things in nature, by 
stressing their practical role over their ontological value. According to this account, different ways of 
classifying things can be chosen according to specific scientific goals and evaluated in terms of their 
usefulness to scientific practice.5 We share with this approach the view that definitions of life inform 
inferences about central properties of systems that serve important practical and theoretical roles. The 
philosophical discussion of whether life is a natural kind or not, we suggest, is not the only, or even 
most important, aspect of defining life. Rather, we are interested in the concept of life as a practical 
and theoretical target in research that aims to investigate the origin of life, design life, or address the 
"salient puzzles about life" (Bedau, 1998: 125; see also Wolfe, 2014). 
																																								 																				
4 The famous example considers two worlds which are exactly the same except that the substance they call water, and 
which exhibits the same sensible properties, has a different composition on each planet. Before such chemical composition 
is discovered, two identical individuals with identical mental states that live in the two planets, would both call the 
substance ‘water’, based on the same concept of what water is. They would think water is the same on both planets. But 
once scientists discover the different chemical composition of the two substances on the respective planets, they show 
that using the same term is wrong: “It follows that the extension of the term ‘water’ is not fully determined by concepts 
in the mind” (Cleland 2012: 134). Putnam’s example has been strongly criticised, as admitted by Cleland herself. Yet, 
she claims, it provides an uncertainty in the relationship between concepts and natural kinds that is sufficient to undermine 
definitional approaches. 
5 According to Brigandt, "[f]or any kind, the philosophically relevant question is an epistemic issue: how scientifically 
important is the grouping of an object into a kind, i.e., what generalizations and explanations can the kind figure in, and 
how important are they?" (Brigandt, 2011). See Dieguez (2013) for a position that combines ontological and practical 
claims. See Amilburu (2015) for a recent detailed classification and discussion of different approaches to natural kinds. 
This is a role akin to definitions of other scientific concepts such as ‘gene’, ‘disease’ or ‘organisms’ 
which play important roles in scientific and philosophical discourses despite a lack of consensus or 
optimism that these correspond to distinct or univocally definable natural kinds (Dupré 1993; Moss 
2001; Scully 2004; Waters, 2006; see also Section 4.2). Like these concepts, the notion of ‘life’ can 
be seen as a conceptual tool for different experimental systems and research programs. It can play an 
important role in the theoretical activity of comparing, through references to definitions, different 
types of systems that are considered as limit cases with epistemic implications (Wolfe, 2014), such 
as viruses (Forterre, 2010) and transient systems at the frontier between Chemistry and Biology 
(Etxeberria and Ruiz-Mirazo, 2009). Such conceptual boundaries can be complex and dynamic, and 
their choice has great theoretical and practical implications in the elaboration of scientific programs 
(Forterre, 2010). From this perspective, unification is not the only – or even most relevant – criteria 
for success. Rather, definitions of life – despite their diversity – reflect ongoing attempts to understand 
the complexity of the central properties of life from different perspectives (see also Malaterre, 2010).  
In the following, we shall examine the role definitions of life in terms of their contributions to the 
theoretical and experimental understanding of life that they support or facilitate.  
3. Defining and redefining life in practice 
Definitions of life play prominent roles in recent interdisciplinary research areas at the frontiers of 
Biology, such as Synthetic Biology, Origins of Life, Astrobiology and computational Artificial Life. 
These fields draw on Engineering, Biochemistry, Physics, Computer Science, etc. in their attempt to 
design and understand systems at the edge of life. This section illuminates the practical role of 
definitions of life in science by analysing the work of the biochemist and synthetic biologist Pier 
Luigi Luisi ─ and of his team at ETH-Z, Zurich and University of Roma Tre ─ in the investigation 
of the transitions to life (Luisi, 1993)6.  
3.1 The case of Luisi's team 
Luisi has been a leading scientist at the crossroads of some of the fields mentioned above, and since 
the early 90’s he has made explicit use of definitions of life. In his work, definitions play a 
fundamental instrumental role in informing experimental research and in the generation of novel 
knowledge: 
Why should one have a definition of life? (…) A definition of life illustrates an 
experimental program: once you have the intellectual clarification of the definition in 
front of you – there you have a challenge to implement it in the laboratory (Luisi, 1998: 
621). 
According to Luisi’s pragmatic view, definitions are directly related to the aims and goals of the 
scientific user, and their ‘success’ is not evaluated in terms of unification or consensus. Rather, their 
utility depends on practical purposes, and "one definition may be more meaningful than another, 
depending on what you want to do with it" (Luisi, 1998: 617). 
																																								 																				
6 The analysis is based on published papers as well as personal interactions between one of the authors and Luisi and his 
team for more than a decade. 
Luisi is known, among other things, for his research on protocells, and more specifically on the 
synthesis of fatty acid and lipid compartments: from micelles to vesicles7. This research line, started 
in the early 90’s after meeting Francisco Varela, was initially based on the following definition of 
living system: "a system which is spatially defined by a semipermeable compartment of its own 
making and which is self-sustaining by transforming external energy/nutrients by its own process of 
component production" (Luisi, 1998: 619). It is a reformulation of the definition of living system as 
an autopoietic organisation given by Maturana and Varela ([1973] 1980)8, and draws on a theoretical 
framework, focused on the idea of organisms as autonomous systems (Moreno & Mossio, 2015). A 
characteristic of this framework is that it attempts to put together into a coherent conceptual 
formulation what are considered the crucial properties common to all living systems. Specifically, it 
integrates metabolism (self-production) and compartmentation (self-distinction from the medium and 
control over concentrations and exchanges) into an organised system capable of achieving self-
maintenance as a whole. 
The use of a definition of life as an autopoietic system ─ formulated in a way that explicitly stresses 
the importance of compartments ─ had an important theoretical impact on the study of the origins of 
life. The synthesis and study of different kinds of compartments has a long history (Hanczyc, 2009). 
But the theory of autopoiesis is among the first contributions that explicitly moved the focus of 
research towards the specific question of the construction of the membrane from within the system, 
in the more encompassing context of the self-production of the organism. Due to this very feature, 
the notion of autopoiesis has played a central role in integrating approaches focused on metabolism 
and compartments in experimental and computational research9. 
This theoretical approach has informed Luisi’s experimental research by guiding it towards types of 
compartments, such as vesicles, capable, in principle, not only of harbouring metabolism, but also of 
being generated and maintained by it (Luisi, 1993). Several experiments inspired by the autopoietic 
definition have been performed over the decades. Zepik, Blöchliger and Luisi (2001) developed a 
chemical model of minimal autopoietic unity (Figure 1) to study the relationship between 
compartments and self-maintenance in the prebiotic world (see also Luisi, 2014). The experiments 
are based on self-producing oleate vesicles that constitute an example of compartmentalised 
protocells10. The boundary of the vesicle is maintained by the continuous replacement of oleic acid 
components (S in the figure) on the surface through the hydrolysis of a precursor A. The originality 
																																								 																				
7 A Micelle is a spherical aggregate of lipid molecules characterised by a hydrophilic polar head directed towards the 
solvent and a hydrophobic tail directed towards the interior. A lipid vesicle is a structure characterised by a fluid core 
enclosed by a lipid bilayer. See Stano and Luisi (2016), for a recent historical review of the main research lines developed 
by Luisi’s research teams in Zurich and Rome. 
8	“[The autopoietic organisation] (...) is a network of production processes (transformation and destruction) of components 
which produces the components which: (1) Through their interactions and transformations, permanently regenerate and 
realize the network of processes (relations) which produces the components; and (2) constitute a concrete unity in space, 
within which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization in that network.” 
(Maturana and Varela [1973] 1980: 79). 
9 Varela et al. (1974) proposed the definition of an autopoietic system together with a computational model of the 
generation and maintenance of a compartment. Thus, early research on Artificial Life was directly related to a specific 
definition. The relationship between the metabolism and the compartment had been stressed in the same years by Gánti 
(1975) through his model of the chemoton, thought of as a possible realisation of a definition of a minimal living system. 
Some of the first (but ultimately unsuccessful) experimental attempts to synthesise an autopoietic system were performed 
by Gloria Guiloff, a graduate student in Maturana’s laboratory at the Universidad de Chile (see Guiloff, 1981). 
10 Oleate vesiscles are spherical bilayer structures that host an aqueous core, and are composed of simple long chain fatty 
acids (such as oleic acid) that are ionised to form hydrogen bonds. 
of Luisi’s chemical model derives from the fact that the anabolic reaction of vesicle production 
(representing growth) is combined with a competitive oxidation reaction, which destroys the 
membrane oleate components (representing catabolism or decay). In this reaction, S is transformed 
into the decay product P. By balancing the relative concentrations of the reagents, and thus the 
velocities of the two reactions, Zepik et al. (2001) obtained a chemical model that could account for 
different and biologically interesting kinetic modes such as homeostasis (when the velocities are 
equal), growth (when production is faster that decay, eventually leading to division and self-
reproduction), and death (when decay is faster than production). The chemical model, thus, allows 
for the exploration of different possible dynamic regimes by modulation of these reactions, providing 
a proof of principle for experimental investigation of possible self-maintaining precursors of current 
living systems11. 
  
Figure 1. The chemical model of the “minimal autopoietic unit”, characterised by two competitive reactions of 
anabolism and catabolism. S represent the oleic acid components of the compartment, A the precursors, and P the decay 
products. From Zepik et al, 2001: 206.  
Additional insights into the role of definitions of life can be derived from Luisi’s work. Definitions 
not only specify individual research trajectories, but also facilitate collaborations and intersections 
between different perspectives. Moreover, they can be combined to generate novel research 
approaches. For example, the common interest in understanding minimal life, by combining internal 
processes and compartments, has brought together scientists with diverging views and definitions of 
life such as Szostak, Bartel and Luisi. The former two support the evolutionary view, while the latter 
the autopoietic view based on autonomy, but these came together in the following proposal:  
How simple can a cell be and still be considered as living? The answer depends on what 
we consider to be the essential properties of life. Defining life is notoriously difficult; 
its very diversity resists the confines of any compact definition. An operational 
approach focuses on identifying simple cellular systems that are both autonomously 
replicating and subject to Darwinian evolution (Szostak et al, 2001: 387).  
																																								 																				
11 Today more sophisticated forms of such experiments are common both in wetware and software domains, but at the 
time they were unusual (see Luisi, 2015). For a comprehensive review of this approach in current systems chemistry see 
Ruiz-Mirazo et al. (2014).  For recent examples of wetware and software applications see Murillo-Sanchez et al. (2016) 
and Agmon et al. (2016), respectively.  
The cited paper became the manifest of a full-fledged research program. Its long-term objective was 
to develop systems of vesicles capable of encapsulating biologically relevant molecules and hosting 
compartmentalised biochemical processes. Furthermore, the vesicles should be capable of 
evolutionary change, with selective pressures arising from functionally advantageous genetic changes 
and vesicle replication12. The relationship between template-directed synthesis of genetic polymers 
and vesicle replication has been explored by Szostak’s group as a step towards the realisation of the 
coupling between template replication and compartment division (Mansy et al, 2008; Adamala & 
Szostak, 2013)13.  
In parallel, the attempt to encapsulate molecules in protocells by Luisi’s group has revealed 
unexpected and interesting results that are still not fully explained (Luisi et al, 2010; Souza et al, 
2014). One of the poorly understood aspects of the origin of life is how self-maintaining protocells 
can arise from separate constituents. For instance, a central question is how molecules, such as 
catalytic RNA (ribozymes) or small peptides, could become entrapped or permeate into a lipid 
compartment and start interacting. Experiments on vesicle formation can illuminate some possible 
answers to how this could have happened. Luisi’s group expected that when vesicles form in diluted 
solutions in the presence of ferritin or ribozymes they exhibit similar (low) concentrations of 
entrapped molecules. However, they observed that most of the vesicles are empty. Yet, few of them 
(about 1%) entrap a very high number of solutes and achieve molecular crowding, possibly favouring 
the beginning of a primitive compartmentalised metabolism (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Entrapment of the protein ferritin inside lipid vesicles (Luisi et al, 2010: 1990 Figure 3). Some vesicles are 
empty while others exhibit a high concentration of ferritin molecules. 
These experiments represent fundamental steps in a research line that is characteristic of a wider 
theoretical approach to the study life and its origins, based on the notion of systemic integration (Bich, 
																																								 																				
12	See Oberholzer et al. (1995) for a preliminary realisation of this idea in oleate vesicles by Luisi’s team at ETH-Zurich. 
This work already shows a flexible attitude towards combining different definitions: "by combining the RNA replication 
with the principles of autopoiesis, we obtained a bridge between the two more accepted views on the theory of minimal 
life, the one based on the “RNA-world” and the other based on the cellular autopoietic view” (See Oberholzer et al., 1995: 
255-256). 
13 Szostak has recently criticised the effort of defining life on the grounds that the origins of life concern transitions, but 
definitions of life do not tell us how these transitions took place (Szostak, 2012; see also Trifonov, 2012). Yet, although 
definitions do not tell what happened, they can guide the scientist in selecting which features to examine: they are not 
answers, but tools. Szostak himself defines life in terms of Darwinian evolution, considered as the “unifying characteristic 
of all Biology” (Szostak, 2012: 599). Accordingly, he focuses primarily on realising in the laboratory those transitions 
that give rise to conditions for evolution, such as the combination of template replication and protocell division (see 
Mansy et al. 2008; Adamala & Szostak, 2013). 
2010). This approach currently numbers several attempts to integrate membrane and metabolism, 
template and membrane, and metabolism and template in synthetic prebiotic systems (reviewed in 
Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 2014).  
3.1 Evolving definitions  
An important aspect of operational definitions is that they are revisable in response to challenges, 
new insights, or criticisms that point to weak spots of the theory on which they are based. Definitions, 
as employed by Luisi and colleagues, have changed over time following the results of theoretical 
reflection and experimental research.  
For example, the biological pertinence of the model of chemical autopoietic system (Fig. 1) developed 
by Luisi and collaborators (Zepik et al, 2001) was theoretically and philosophically questioned by 
Luisi, himself, and Michel Bitbol (Bitbol and Luisi, 2004). The chemical model appears too limited 
if compared to a minimal organism such as a bacterium. Only few (simplified) reactions take place 
in the chemical system, whereas a full-fledged living system, capable of metabolism, is capable of 
interacting with the environment by reacting conservatively to external perturbations. This aspect is 
not explicitly addressed by the definition and the related model, even though it is part of the more 
general theory of autopoiesis. Hence, this reflection led to the reformulation of the definition of life 
based on autopoiesis, with the incorporation of another aspect of the theory which previously was not 
included: cognition, in its minimal meaning of the capacity to interact with the environment and 
respond to changes in it (Damiano & Luisi, 2010; Bich & Damiano, 2012). According to the 
‘redefined’ version, "a living system is a system capable of self-production and self-maintenance 
through a regenerative network of processes which takes place within a boundary of its own making 
and regenerates itself through cognitive or adaptive interactions with the medium." (Damiano & 
Luisi, 2010: 149, italics ours). This example shows that definitions can change within the framework 
provided by a specific theory.  
Another interesting aspect of operational definitions is that attempts to respond to challenges for the 
theoretical framework on which they are based can lead to modifications or to novel experimental 
results. Research based on the autopoietic definition of life traditionally focused on individual cells 
(represented as individual vesicles). The focus is justified through the interest in the simplest unit of 
life. Yet, the relatively recent recognition in the microbiology community that unicellular organisms 
live in colonies (see for example Costerton et al. 1995; Dupré and O’Malley, 2009), has given support 
to the idea that life might have arisen from cooperative mechanisms between prebiotic systems 
(Carrara et al. 2012). Moreover, experiments with single vesicles (especially liposomes14) give 
limited results due to their low permeability and incur into difficulties in realising an exchange of 
materials between individual vesicles. In response to such challenges, Luisi’s group investigated the 
properties of colonies of giant vesicles (Carrara el al., 2012, Figure 3), an approach previously 
unexplored in the literature. Using oleate-based vesicles allowed the researchers to explore functional 
features of a negatively charged membrane. They observed that the vesicles in contact with 
polycations form physically stable colonies which attach to the solid substrate (like biofilms) and 
could attract positively charged compounds at the surface.  
																																								 																				
14 Liposomes are vesicles composed of phospholipids, the lipids that compose current cell membranes. They are more 
stable but less permeable than oleate vesicles. 
 Figure 3. Reciprocal attraction of colonies of giant vesicles (Carrara et al, 2012, Figure S5). See text for details. 
Importantly, the study led to discovering unexpected features of vesicle colonies that better mimic 
some biological processes, compared to individual vesicles. These include a demonstrated increased 
permeability and a capability to incorporate solute. Moreover, using fluorescent t-RNA the group 
showed how also larger compounds can attach to the colony surface and more slowly penetrate the 
membrane without breaking the vesicles’ macrostructure. The latter operationalisation corresponds 
to a possible scenario of the origin of metabolism where externally formed polymers are captured by 
primitive compartments. Moreover, they observed colony accretion ─ which is also observed in 
bacterial biofilms ─ vesicle fusion, and the exchange of material between vesicles (Carrara et al., 
2012). In this case, a debate on the adequate operational criteria for studying the origins of life 
stimulated by the discussion of the limits of a definition, have improved both the definition and the 
experimental models of primitive cell communities. This example also shows that definitions can 
provide a context for the discussion and revision of concepts and theory. 
3.2 General roles and applications in different fields at the frontiers of Biology 
The case of Luisi’s group shows that definitions are used and can be useful as operational tools to 
guide research in Origins of Life and Synthetic Biology. More generally, definitions can play a 
theoretical, epistemological, practical, and even ethical role15 in several disciplines at the frontiers of 
biology. Their content can range from life considered as a collective phenomenon ─ the living world 
or the biosphere in general16 ─ or as the distinctive character of any individual living system.  
Definitions play an important role in fields where research is guided, at least in part, by explicit or 
implicit assumptions on the difference between living and non-living systems, and where the goal is 
theoretical advancement through analysis, challenging, testing and subsequently improving models 
of living systems. They are often used in the construction of theoretical models17 aimed at explicitly 
characterising or simulating, some crucial features of basic biological systems. Examples are 
unfamiliar forms of life (Rasmussen et al, 2008), or transient systems (Etxeberria & Ruiz-Mirazo, 
2009) such as prebiotic systems and protocells.  
																																								 																				
15	The role of definitions of life related to ethics has ramifications that extend to environmental ethics and medicine 
(Machery, 2012). The role of definitions of life in ethics is beyond the scope of this paper, which is focused on the role 
played by definitions in the frontier disciplines aforementioned. 
16 This is the case, for example, of those approaches which include Darwinian evolution as a crucial property to define 
life. 
17 Or are identified with theoretical models of minimal living systems (see Letelier et al., 2011)  
The epistemological role of definitions of life is directly or indirectly related to the specific goals and 
distinctive features of the different domains of investigation in the research fields mentioned above. 
Definitions may provide insights and guidance in the design of experimental18 or computational 
research programs19, in the synthesis of proto-biological systems20, or in the realisation of biological 
relevant properties21. Furthermore, they are sometimes used in order to identify or detect living 
systems22, or to distinguish them from non-living ones23.   
Different fields can have different contents and criteria of "practical operationability" (Luisi, 1998), 
i.e., the actual uses for definitions as tools to guide and inspire experimental research and theoretical 
debate. Yet, discussions and hybridisations often cut across disciplinary boundaries, as do many of 
the scientists involved. Origins of life research often relies on definitions in orienting the investigation 
of the fundamental steps towards, or requirements for, life and applies them in the design and 
construction of plausible prebiotic systems and properties. In research on protocells (e.g., Rasmussen 
et al., 2008; Stano & Mavelli, 2015) ─ the coherent unities that constitute the infrastructures enabling 
the origins of life24 ─ definitions are used to provide criteria of pertinence and relevance in the design 
of biologically significant systems. For example, they are used to guide decisions regarding which 
basic functions should be included in the protocells in order to make them plausible models of 
possible precursors of life. Similarly, in some branches of Synthetic Biology definitions play a role 
in the choice of relevant or interesting biological properties to implement in synthetic systems (Ruiz-
Mirazo & Moreno, 2013). Moreover, as acknowledged in the literature in Synthetic Biology, the 
evaluation of results in the design of synthetic cells is particularly problematic in the absence of 
definitions (see for example, Cronin, et al., 2006; Forlin et al, 2012)25.  
In Artificial Life definitions are used, for example, in the selection of the relevant properties of life 
that should be simulated. Moreover, this field has been characterised by intense theoretical debates 
on the possible domains of realisation of life. For instance, it has been debated whether life requires 
metabolism, and therefore a chemical and molecular domain(Rosen, 1991; Boden, 1999; Moreno and 
Etxeberria, 2005), or whether life could be realised regardless of the material substrate, even in 
software simulations (Langton, 1989; Ray, 1992; Grand et al, 1996)26. Definitions play a primary role 
in Astrobiology as well27, where the difference in criteria of practical operationability, compared to 
other disciplines, is particularly striking. In this domain, definitions function as sources of criteria for 
																																								 																				
18 As argued in Ruiz-Mirazo & Moreno (2013). Examples of this use of definitions are Guiloff (1981), Fleischaker (1990), 
Luisi (1993), Murillo-Sanchez et al. (2016). 
19 Discussed in Boden (1999). Examples are Ruiz-Mirazo & Mavelli (2008), Piedrafita et al. (2010), van Segbroeck et al. 
(2009), Zachar et al. (2011), Shirt-Ediss et al. (2014), Agmon et al. (2016). 
20 Discussed in Ruiz-Mirazo & Moreno (2004), Bich & Damiano (2007). Examples are Szostak et al. (2001), Zepick et 
al. (2001), Stano & Mavelli (2015). 
21 For example Rasmussen et al. (2008), Mansy et al. (2008), Luisi et al. (2006). 
22 Discussed in Raulin (2010), Cyzweska (201)1.See Cleland (2012) and Bains (2013) for alternative views. 
23 See for example Forterre (2010). 
24 See Shirt-Ediss (2016) for a thorough analysis of the protocells approach to study the origins of life.   
25	An alternative proposal advanced by Cronin et al. (2006) has been to design and implement Turing tests for lifeness, to 
have real cells evaluate artificial ones. Yet, the value of the test is only limited to life-like interactions. 
26 For a discussion of the role of definitions of life in Artificial Life see for example Umerez (1995). 
27 Consider for instance the NASA effort to formulate a definition to help decide which experiment to realise to detect 
life on Mars: "Life is a self-sustained chemical system capable of undergoing Darwinian evolution" (discussed for 
example in Luisi, 1998). For a criticism of this enterprise see Cleland (2012). 
the detection of life, rather than for the design and construction of it. Systems Biology28 and Prebiotic 
Systems Chemistry29 are other examples of fields involved in developing an integrated account of 
biological systems where definitions of life have become more prominent.  
In summary, with the emergence and development of these fields working on problems regarding the 
characterisation, detection, design and synthesis of life, definitions of life play important roles as 
boundary concepts for specifying research approaches and specific operations. These examples 
provide empirical resistance to the assumptions that most biologists take life to be a natural kind and 
that the purpose of definitions of life in science is to demarcate this (e.g., Cleland, 2012: 127). In the 
cases we have examined, even the heuristic use of definitions to establish whether something is alive 
or not, is actually marginal, compared to their more general role as tools in actively guiding research. 
In the following section we will attempt to systematise this operational view of definitions as opposed 
to an ontological one, and answer possible objections. 
 
4. Operational definitions and their virtues 
We have shown that in several fields definitions of life are used in a way that is not necessarily related 
to carving out natural categories in a strong ontological sense, and their value does not depend on 
consensus, but rather on their impact on research. Scientists pragmatically define life consistently 
with the current and continuously changing biological theory as well as according to their own 
specific theoretical and experimental perspective and goals. The examples taken from the work of 
Luisi and colleagues show this instrumental use for definitions: they are directly involved in scientific 
practice, and play an active operational role in guiding theoretical and experimental research and in 
generating novel knowledge. 
In the examined examples, definitions are exploratory tools that can change over time and across 
research programs. This use does	not imply a requirement of a unique, complete and definitive set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for all life (and only life) as we know it, or the commitment to 
strong ontological claims. Instead, such tools point out some possible necessary conditions for life 
which are considered plausible and interesting in the context of current theories and available 
experimental techniques30. In doing so they aim at identifying a set of conditions that are satisficing 
for the purposes of research, rather than sufficient31. The notion of operational definitions captures 
this use ─ which is dependent upon theory and directly involved in scientific practice ─ by pointing 
																																								 																				
28 Examples are Cornish-Bowden (2006), Wolkenhauer and Hofmeyr (2007), Piedrafita et al. (2010), and Letelier et al. 
(2011). 
29 See Ruiz-Mirazo et al. (2014) for a review of the emerging field of Prebiotic Systems Chemistry and of the role played 
in it by definitions of life. 
30 The reason we emphasize necessary, rather than sufficient conditions, is that these are more pertinent tools in the 
scientific practices we examine here. The targets are simple life-like, prebiotic or minimal living systems, that is, systems 
that do not exhibit all the features of life, or just the minimal ones. Accordingly, the focus of research is on individual, or 
sets of, necessary conditions for life, and on their emergence or precursors in the prebiotic world. 
31	We find that this use of definitions is better reflected by the term ‘satisficing’ rather than ‘sufficient’. The term 'suffice', 
a mix of 'suffice' and 'satisfy', has been introduced by Herbert Simon (1956) to denote an heuristic strategy according to 
which a decision is made in real life when it satisfies the minimum requirements necessary to achieve a certain goal (see 
also Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). It better fits our view of definitions of life, because the necessary conditions that are 
to be included in a definition, and where to stop, are pragmatic choices dependent on practical and theoretical purposes. 
Moreover, this choice has a limited validity in time, insofar as definitions are refined in response to criticism, empirical 
results and new issues to be addressed.	
out the importance of the active (operational) role they play in the design and evaluation of observable 
operations in the relevant domain of investigation. We agree with Fleischaker that in this context "the 
force of any operational definition is its capability of exhibition in the laboratory" (Fleischaker, 1990: 
131)32. Accordingly, in our view, operational definitions coherently combine, or integrate into a 
theoretical model, a set of mutually dependent necessary and satisficing criteria for life that imply 
observable operations, and that are considered pertinent and relevant for research33.  
This approach fits with the way that many scientists, such as Luisi (e.g. Damiano & Luisi, 2011), 
refer to necessary and sufficient conditions for life but in the context of revisable or provisional 
definitions. Operational definitions provide a theoretical background to guide research and evaluate 
the relevance of experimental results, rather than strong demarcation criteria for a unique and rigid 
categorisation of natural systems.  
As illustrated in Section 3.2, the principles for the use and experimental application of these 
definitions, i.e. criteria for practical operationability, can vary from one domain to the other: for 
example, design and construction of life for Synthetic Biology and Origins of Life, and guidelines for 
detection experiments in the case of Astrobiology. Criteria for practical operationability should not 
be confused with another important element of definitions, that is, operational criteria for life. The 
latter concern the specific contents of the definition, i.e., the set of relevant and pertinent necessary 
conditions for life according to a certain line of research. Consider for example the application of the 
definition of autopoiesis to the study of the origins of life. According to Fleischaker, "demonstration 
of the autopoietic criteria would result in the assembly of a living cell-system: a system boundary 
structure and a network of synthetic pathways for the production and replacement of system 
components" (Fleischaker, 1990: 131). The first part of the quotation concerns criteria for practical 
operationability indicating where, for what purposes, and how to apply the definition in the laboratory 
practice. In this case, the aim is to build a cell, in other cases, it may be to realise a simulation, to 
design tests to detect living systems, etc. The second part focuses on operational criteria: the specific 
contents of the definition that will be applied in a specific research practice. In this case, the contents 
include a boundary and minimal metabolism ("a network of synthetic pathways") capable of 
producing and replacing the components of the system.  
 
The two dimensions do not necessarily coincide, as scientists sharing the same operational criteria 
might have different criteria for practical operationability, and apply the same definition in different 
ways and with different goals. For instance, while taking the same focus on boundary structure and 
synthetic pathways, Fleischaker (1990) aims at building a cell in the laboratory, whereas Agmon et 
al. (2016) aim at simulating the interplay between rates of metabolic reactions and changes in 
membrane properties. 
 
4.1. The integrated nature of operational definitions 
																																								 																				
32 We refer to the use of operational definitions in the literature of these disciplines at the frontiers of Biology (see for 
example Fleischaker, 1990 and Luisi, 1998, among others). 
33 To make it clearer, it may be useful to specify that definitions whose central properties and phenomena that are not in 
principle or practically possible to study in the laboratory or in simulations (e.g. entelechies or unspecified dispositions) 
do not satisfy the operational criteria. 
The case of Luisi and collaborators shows that operational definitions are used and can be useful in 
science, not only for providing guidance to well-established research programs, but also for 
developing previously unexplored research lines and producing unexpected results. We do not claim 
that the cases examined are representative of all approaches to definitions in these fields. However, 
we take the examples to offer resistance to the view that attempts to define life are pointless. Our aim 
is simply to show that (operational) definitions of life can be useful in scientific practice, by guiding 
the development of a research program, providing criteria for the evaluation of results, and in 
generating new lines of investigations. Before we further unpack the virtues of operational definitions, 
we address the possible objection that the notion of definitions may not be necessary or useful to 
capture these aspects of the scientific practice. 
Cleland and Chyba (2007), Griesemer (2015) and Bains (2015) propose to replace integrated 
definitions with a variety of "tentative criteria" or "practical tests" (Bains, 2015) for life: a series of 
properties and phenomena usually related to our knowledge of life, but not defining or delimiting life. 
While this approach offers a way to avoid the problems faced by definitions (in the traditional sense), 
the flexibility also results in a fragmentation of the criteria that have limitations for accounting for 
some important aspects of the scientific practices in which definitions of life are used. Specifically, 
tentative criteria cannot account for how life-processes are realized through organisms functioning as 
integrated wholes. A crucial aspect that distinguishes definitions from criteria for life in general is 
precisely that in definitions criteria are put together into a model or a set of mutually dependent 
necessary conditions.  
An interesting aspect that can be evinced from Luisi’s work is that the use of an integrated definition 
of life allows far reaching investigations, such as those integrating metabolism and compartment. 
Inspired by Luisi's definition of life, Noireaux and Libchaber (2004) experimentally studied the 
integrated relations between metabolism and the permeability of the compartment. They emphasize 
how metabolism in protocells can improve the permeability of a lipid bilayer compartment. This 
process, in turn, improves the viability of metabolism itself by facilitating the exchange of 
biochemical compounds with the environment without lysing or perturbing the membrane. These 
integrative aspects may be missed if one focuses only on scattered criteria or properties of life.  
The integration into one coherent system of several types of kinetic (catalysts), spatial 
(compartments) and template (genetic) components or subsystems is considered the basis for the 
realisation of a self-maintaining and self-producing biochemical machinery (see for example, Bich et 
al, 2016). Experimentally and theoretically speaking, this is not a trivial issue, but an extremely 
important one, because pre-existing molecular or supramolecular complexes cannot be simply 
recruited and coupled together. Integration requires a matching between the features of the 
subsystems involved: e.g., the composition of the membrane and the position of molecular 
machineries to meet the demands of metabolism, and the synthesis of the right components by 
metabolism to be used in compartments to achieve certain permeability (Shirt-Ediss, 2016). As 
recently argued by Alvaro Moreno, "the encapsulation of a self-maintaining chemical system has far-
reaching organisational implications since its viability imposes significant changes on both parts 
(compartments and metabolic networks) in order to enable a functional coupling between them" 
(Moreno 2016, 10). The basic subsystems need not only to be matched, but also their activity and 
rates to be functionally coordinated in order to achieve integration, and to avoid conflict.  
Thus, a central aspect of defining life operationally is to investigate how the relevant conditions and 
processes included in definitions of life can be realised and made compatible with one another, in a 
theoretical as well as experimental sense. The distinct necessary conditions for life involved in a 
definition exhibit an integrated character that needs to be accounted for in theoretical, experimental 
and computational models representing a system as living or life-like34. A particularly hard challenge 
in the fields we examine is to integrate the functioning of different subsystems that are necessary to 
realise and maintain a protocell, a virtual cell, or a minimal living system in such a way as to achieve 
viable compatibility and interdependence (Rasmussen et al, 2008).  
It may be objected to our proposal that many examples in the scientific practice fit better with the 
account of tentative criteria. For instance, Griesemer’s alternative to definitions of life, centred on 
tentative criteria, is empirically based on an analysis of Gánti’s chemoton theory (Gánti, 1979; 2003a; 
2003b; Griesemer and Szathmary, 2009). Griesemer (2015) argues that despite using the term 
definition and proposing one, Gánti as an engineer engaged primarily in an explorative research 
program where criteria for life functioned as heuristics for the elaboration and manipulation of 
theoretical models. In our view, however, there is no contradiction between these two aspects 
(definitions and explorative heuristics). To explain why, we examine Gánti’s work in futher detail.  
Gánti proposes a definition of life formulated in terms of a coherent set of criteria for life and an 
integrated model.	His definition is based on ten criteria for life35: five absolute ones, to be satisfied 
by any living system (unity, metabolism, inherent stability, information carrying components; 
regulation) and five potential, necessary for the sustained existence of a living world (growth; 
multiplication; hereditary change; evolution; mortality). The absolute criteria are integrated into a 
model of a minimal living system capable of fulfilling them, in such a way that they are mutually 
dependent. The Chemoton (figure 4) is a hypothetical system organised as a biochemical “clockwork” 
(Gánti 2003b).  
																																								 																				
34	This is not necessary the case for all definitions. "Something is X if and only if it is red and square" does not raise 
problems of integration as long as 'red' and 'square' are independent properties. We thank an anonymous reviewer for 
pointing out the need to make this point more explicit. 
35 The criteria change slightly in different publications of Gánti’s work. 
 
Figure 4. Scheme of Gánti’s chemoton with the three coupled subsystems: a metabolic cycle, a template replication cycle 
and a compartment (Moreno & Mossio, 2015: 26). 
Three autocatalytic reaction loops (metabolic cycle, template subsystem and compartment) are 
directly coupled to each other, and realise the system as a unity. The individual unit (delimited by a 
membrane) is realised by the metabolic activity of production of the membrane and of the information 
carrying components. Metabolism, in turn, is made possible by the membrane, which allows 
substrates to enter the system, and waste to exit without accumulating in the systems, while avoiding 
at the same time the dispersion the molecules that are crucial for the internal processes. Metabolic 
components are also constrained by an information-carrying template (genetic) subsystem which, in 
Gánti's model in figure 4, specifies the possible length of metabolites. The different subsystems are 
then mutually stabilised by homeostatic mechanisms such as feedback loops and cycles. According 
to Gánti, the template also acts as an internal regulatory mechanism that "provides for the cooperation 
between genetic substance and homeostatic subsystem" (Gánti, 1979: 20) by controlling the system’s 
functions and enabling the activity of the system as a unity, etc. 36. Gánti's Chemoton, therefore, 
constitutes a basic case of integration in which three of the most commonly mentioned necessary 
conditions of life, namely metabolism, membrane and template replication, are mutually dependent 
and functionally combined. Our view, thus, is compatible with Griesemer’s interpretation of Gánti’s 
goals without giving up (but accounting for) the effective use of definitions by Gánti and other 
theoretical biologists involved in a similar enterprise of building definitions as abstract theoretical 
models. 
This dimension of definitions related to integration is especially important in our current historical 
context in which integrative approaches to life, such as that of Systems Biology, are being developed 
with the aim to overcome the intrinsic limitations exhibited by reductionist ones (Cornish-Bowden, 
2006; Wolkenhauer and Hofmeyr, 2007). As argued by Ruiz-Mirazo et al.: "theoretical and 
philosophical efforts to define life also contribute to those integrative approaches, providing a global 
theoretical framework that may help to deal with or interpret the huge amount of data being collected 
																																								 																				
36 The characterisation of the template subsystem as a 'regulatory' mechanism is controversial, and it has been criticised 
by Bich et al. (2016). 
by current high-throughput technologies, in this so-called “omics’ revolution”" (Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 
2010: 203). Similarly, Fleischaker stresses the role of integration in a cautionary note on the study of 
individual mechanisms: "[A]lthough a particular mechanism might appear promising in that it 
satisfies one operational requirement or another, that mechanism is feasible for minimal cell operation 
only if it can be integrated with all the other operational mechanisms, it is theoretically consistent in 
combination. When we can provide the operational mechanisms and all their interrelationships in 
intricate detail, we will be describing a plausible candidate for the minimal cell" (Fleischaker 1990: 
135-136). This point is still relevant in current Synthetic Biology where the lack of clear theoretically 
grounded means of evaluating the outcomes of experimental efforts in building artificial cells has 
slowed the advancement of research in the field (Forlin et al. 2012). 
In summary, while scattered criteria of life suggested by Cleland, Griesemer and Bains avoid the 
criticism targeted towards strong ontological definitions, this approach misses one of the aspects that 
make living systems both interesting and difficult to study from the theoretical and practical points 
of view, namely their integrated character.  
 
4.2 Further criticisms to operational definitions and responses 
To clarify further important aspects of operational definitions, we now address the last three of the 
general criticisms advanced by Cleland, targeted at the use of definitions. The first concerns how 
operational definitions relate to theories. Cleland (2012) argues that while definitions aim at capturing 
entire theories of life, theories are always wider and entail many more assumptions than what can be 
contained by definitions. This latter idea does not contrast with our view, according to which 
definitions summarize aspects of a theory that are considered crucial for a specific research project. 
They provide a set of necessary and satisficing (yet not sufficient, see footnotes 30 and 31) conditions 
for life, by selecting contextually relevant elements of the theory. For instance, Luisi’s definition of 
life in terms of autopoiesis was built and used as a summary of the theory, reflecting only part of it, 
but was revised as a result of a shift within the theoretical perspective (to include responsiveness to 
the environment) and to enlarge it in response to new empirical research (from individual and isolated 
cells to cell colonies, and). Yet, from the operational point of view, unlike for Cleland, this is not a 
flaw: definitions play relevant roles in science due to the flexibility enabled by this very feature, 
because they facilitate communication, debate and revision of experimental strategies.  
The second criticism is that definitions might favour the entrenching of misconceptions, due to the 
fact that they tend to fix our knowledge into some static categories that make us blind to alternatives 
(Cleland, 2012). This problem is general for any heuristic strategy or model used in research. Yet, 
unguided and unbiased search for patterns or phenomena is rarely, if ever, a possible alternative. 
Operational definitions, like models or tentative criteria, are fallible tools that can be misleading but 
may also be used as stepping stones for better theories. The examples in Section 3.1. on minimal 
cognition and vesicle colonies show that insofar as definitions are theory based, they can be revised 
both within the context of a theory or as a result of revision of the theory itself. Whereas Cleland 
(2012) seems to assume that definitions of life aim (unsuccessfully) to express complete theories of 
life, we argue that definitions are instruments for the development of such theories. If theories are 
incomplete, provisional and changeable, so or even more so are the definitions that summarise parts 
of them. Moreover, the very plurality of definitions of life, and the possibility of combining them 
(Oberholtzer, 1995; Szostak, 2001), suggests that these do not fix research and enforce of 
misconceptions but are continuously debated, challenged, and approached from different 
perspectives. In summary, agreement is not the pertinent requirement for a good definition. 
Accordingly, we view the question about the importance of definitions of life as a matter of relevance 
and utility for research, rather than an issue about the potential for consensus37. For example, the lack 
of agreement on the definition of species does not prevent scientists from using this flexible notion 
to discuss extinctions and biodiversity (see for example Monastersky, 2014). Similarly, instead of 
seeing the existence of multiple gene concepts as an unwanted inconsistency in scientific 
terminology, multiple definitions can provide flexibility for distinct research purposes and insights to 
characteristics of different scientific fields or contexts (Waters, 2006). Importantly, the existence of 
disciplinary differences in concepts like ‘genes’ does not make it pointless for scientists and 
philosophers to reflect on limits and qualities of different definitions, or to discuss the type of gene 
concept that should be communicated to the public (Bartol 2013). The same is the case for disease 
classification where giving up the idea that diseases in general form a natural kind does not leave 
debates about the scope and content of disease concepts obsolete, e.g., as showed in discussions about 
how disease categories relate to abnormalities and risk factors (Scully, 2004). From this point of view, 
the very plurality of definitions used in biology is not pointless and useless, but can stimulate the 
debate and counteract the risk of dogmatic approaches to life and the entrenching of misconceptions. 
This perspective also allows us to comment on Cleland’s prosed solution to the aforementioned 
problem of definitions in the context of Astrobiology, namely to focus on detecting anomalies rather 
than systems that satisfy a definition. In Cleland’s view, looking for anomalies allows for more 
flexibility than specific conditions for life selected according to a single, limited, framework. This is 
indeed an ingenious heuristic proposal, but is not as opposed to definitions as it might seem. It is also 
an operation that is theory dependent. Just like detection of abnormalities and diseases is dependent 
on knowledge about normal functional states, so is detection of abnormalities in this context is 
dependent on an understanding of the 'normal' characteristics of life. In addition, approaches focused 
on anomalies, and more generally on tentative criteria, provide only tools to look for interesting cases, 
which are worth more attention. They do not provide diagnostic tools for discussing and deciding on 
whether candidates for alternative life forms can be considered alive, which is what definitions help 
to do. If we accept an operational view of definitions, we believe that the two approaches should be 
considered as complementary, rather than mutually exclusive: a combination of negative heuristics 
based on the search for anomalies, and positive heuristics derived from tentative necessary and 
sufficing conditions of life according to instrumental definitions. 
The third criticism draws on the argument that our current understanding of biology is still limited, 
and we are far from having a general theory of living systems on which to rely to build general 
categorisations concerning life. From this standpoint, trying to fix our knowledge into definitions 
would obstruct science rather than contribute to its development. The main argument in support of 
this claim is that biology is based only on a single example of life: that part of the terrestrial biosphere 
																																								 																				
37	In the operational framework proposed here, the lack of consensus does not derive from a disagreement on how to 
demarcate life as a natural kind. Rather, it is related to the evaluation of different research programs (or subprograms) 
and modelling frameworks underlying definitions, i.e. on which are the most relevant theoretical and practical problems 
to be solved and questions to be asked and how to best address them. Disagreements on definitions are in this sense not 
different from scientific disagreements on the best model or modelling framework for solving scientific puzzles.  
that we currently know. Until we find other forms of life to compare to ours, we cannot distinguish 
essential from contingent properties of living systems and build a general theory of life (Cleland, 
2012). Although the importance of discovering new forms of life is unquestionable, the assumption 
that encountering new life forms would possibly undermine our understanding of biology does not 
justify the need to suspend our attempts at developing and improving a theory of living systems. 
Science does not stop producing theories on the basis of the possibility that new discoveries might 
revolutionise them, and the idea of distinguishing sharply and ultimately between necessary and 
contingent aspects of the physical world has been problematised even in the context of physical laws 
(Mitchell, 2005). Thus, there is no reason to abandon the project of a general theory of life, and stop 
thinking about what living systems are until we are certain to have the whole picture covered. Recall 
also that operational definitions allows for differences in practical operationability so that the scope 
of definitions may vary depending on the purposes, and is not supposed to cover all possible 
scenarios. It is here interesting to note that Luisi (1998) criticises NASA’s definition of life 
(specifically the requirement of Darwinian evolution) as being too restrictive in the context of 
Astrobiology, while including some of its insights into his experimental program in Origins of Life 
(Oberholzer et al, 1995; Szostak et al, 2001). At the moment, however, it is not even clear whether or 
when we are going to find alternative life forms, and tentative criteria or anomalies alone provide 
limited help in their identification.  
Finally, we should consider that life on Earth exhibits remarkable diversity with a variety of forms, 
behaviours and adaptability to different and extreme environments. Functionally speaking38, 
therefore, a widely differentiated collection of examples is already available from which to start 
building well grounded, yet always provisional, theories and definitions capable of providing 
distinctions between some necessary and contingent properties of life and, also, to make sense of the 
increasing amount of data (Ruiz-Mirazo et al, 2010). 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
We have argued that in order to account for the use of definitions of life in science, it is necessary to 
revisit the requirements we impose on definitions. In our view, at least two distinct and opposing 
kinds and uses of definitions of life are discussed in the literature. In this paper, we have contrasted 
what we can call strong definitions (Cleland, 2012) to our proposal of operational definitions 
(Fleischaker, 1991; Luisi, 1998)39. Strong definitions aim at providing answers to questions regarding 
natural kinds, by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions. As we demonstrated with examples, 
operational definitions better capture the use of definitions in Origins of Life and Synthetic Biology. 
These are considered tools that express and integrate necessary criteria for life that are considered 
pertinent, relevant and sufficing for research, and that imply observable operations.  
																																								 																				
38 A functional perspective, open to multiple realisability in the molecular domain, can be generalised to other possible 
forms of life, as it is not univocally committed to the exact biochemical composition of life as we know it, that is: DNA, 
RNA and proteins made with the specific subset amino acids of known life, the same genetic code, etc. 
39 Strong and operational definitions are not the only possible kinds of definitions of life. Intermediate positions between 
these two are also possible, for example combining instrumental claims with more moderate ontological ones (an example 
is Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 2004), which nevertheless would require a philosophical justification against Machery's and 
Cleland's criticisms. 
These two kinds of definitions are characterised by different and often incompatible claims, 
requirements, and aims (Figure 5). While strong definitions attempt to provide a complete set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions, operational definitions focus on an open-ended set of possible 
necessary and satisficing conditions for life according to the specific requirements and goals of 
different research programs. Accordingly, while strong definitions might establish static 
categorisations, operational ones allow for flexibility and revisability. Finally, while strong 
definitions strive for unification and thereby set consensus as their success criterion, operational 
definitions rely on pluralism as a source of production of novel knowledge, and on practical and 
theoretical utility as the featured value. While the former are more demanding in terms of 
philosophical justification and are subject to profound criticisms (Machery, 2012; Cleland, 2012), the 
latter better conform to scientific practice and goals, to the actual uses of definitions in science, and 
can be applied to specific case studies.  
 
 
STRONG DEFINITIONS OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
(Strong) ontological claim 
Demarcating life: carving out natural kinds 
Instrumental claim 
Theoretical and epistemic tools: guidance for 
debate and experiments 
Complete 
Necessary and sufficient conditions 
Open-ended 
Necessary (and satisficing) provisional 
conditions 
Fixed 
Static categories 
Flexible 
Variation in practical operationability 
Definitions evolve over time 
 
Unification 
Consensus and generalization of 
characteristics of all life are the key values 
Pluralist 
Target of debate, challenge and revision  
Utility is the key value  
 
Figure 5. Comparison between strong and operational definitions 
 
In summary, we have questioned the assumption that the only (or even main) purpose of definitions 
of life is to establish a set of universal criteria that strongly demarcate natural kinds. In doing so we 
have focused on the role played by definitions in scientific practice rather than on whether or not 
strong ontological definitions are possible. From this standpoint, we suggest that the use of definitions 
in scientific practice may be better captured by a pluralist and operational perspective in which 
definitions can serve various epistemic purposes by combining	variety and flexibility with the need 
for useful tools and categorisations towards scientific aims. Even if the criticisms against strong 
definitions of life are accepted, there is still a role for definitions of life in science, which is played 
by operational definitions. We have highlighted how a number of case studies demonstrate the 
practical and theoretical value of this kind of definitions in guiding the classification, detection, 
design and understanding of different life forms.  
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